# **Fault-Tolerant Embedded System**

#### **COE718: Embedded Systems Design** http://www.ecb.torontomu.ca/~courses/coe718/

Dr. Gul N. Khan http://www.ecb.torontomu.ca/~gnkhan Electrical and Computer Engineering Toronto Metropolitan University

### **Overview**

- Reliability Concepts
- Fault, Error and Sources of Faults
- Fault-tolerant Techniques
- Hardware and Software Fault-tolerance
- Fault Recovery

#### Fault-tolerant articles at the course WebPage

## High Performance Embedded Systems

### **Many Safety Critical Applications Demand:**

- High Performance
  - High Speed I/O Mb  $\Rightarrow$  Gb/Sec
  - Large Memory (128 MB  $\Rightarrow$  4 GB)
  - Redundant Hardware and Reliable Software
- Fault-tolerance
- Tight Performance, Reliability and Availability Deadlines

Fault Tolerant Embedded Systems

2

## Reliability

#### **RELIABILITY: Survival Probability**

When function is critical during the mission time.

#### **AVAILABILITY:**

**The fraction of time a system meets its specification.** Good when continuous service is important but it can be delayed or denied

FAILSAFE: System fails to a known safe state

#### **DEPENDABILITY:**

Generalization: system does the right thing at right time.

©G.Khan

# **System Reliability: Preliminaries**

The Reliability,  $R_F(t)$  of a System is the probability that no fault of the class F occurs (i.e. system survives) during time t.

 $R_F(t) = \Pr[t_{init} \le t < t_f \text{ for all } f \in F]$ 

where  $t_{init}$  is time of introduction of the system to service  $t_f$  is time of occurrence of the first failure f drawn from F Failure Probability,  $Q_F(t)$  is complementary to  $R_F(t)$  $R_F(t) + Q_F(t) = 1$ 

We can take off the F subscript from  $R_F(t)$  and  $Q_F(t)$ 

When the lifetime of a system is exponentially distributed, the reliability of the system is:  $R(t) = e^{-\lambda t}$ 

The parameter  $\lambda$  is called the failure rate

©G. Khan

# **Component Reliability Model**

#### It is not so straight forward.



During useful life, components exhibit a constant failure rate  $\lambda$ . Reliability of a device can be modeled using an exponential distribution.  $R(t) = e^{-\lambda t}$ 

 $\lambda$  is the failure rate

©G. Khan

Fault-Tolerant Embedded Systems

## **Component Failure Rate**

# **Failure rates often expressed in failures / million operating hours**

Automotive Embedded System Component	Failure Rate, λ
Military Microprocessor	0.022
Typical Automotive Microprocessor	0.12
Electric Motor Lead/Acid battery	16.9
Oil Pump	37.3
Automotive Wiring Harness (luxury)	775

6

# **MTTF: <u>Mean Time To Failure</u>**

**MTTF: Mean Time to Failure or Expected Life MTTF: Mean Time To (first) Failure is defined as the expected value of t**<sub>f</sub>  $MTTF = E[t_f] = \int_{0}^{\infty} R(t)dt = \frac{1}{\lambda}$ 

where  $\lambda$  is the failure<sup>o</sup> rate.

MTTF of a system is the expected time of the first failure in a sample of identical initially perfect systems.

**MTTR: Mean Time To Repair** is defined as the expected time for repair.

MTBF: Mean Time Between Failure MTBF is approximated as MTTF for systems that do not permit repair.

MTBF, MTTR are applicable to repairable systems.

## **MTTF-MTTD-MTTR** Availability = MTBF/(MTBF + MTTR)



A Scenario for on-line detection and off-line repair. The measures – MTBF, MTTD, and MTTR are the average times to failure, to detection, and to repair.

# **Serial System Reliability**

### **Serially Connected Components** Let $R_k(t)$ is the reliability of a single component k is given $R_k(t) = e^{-\lambda_k t}$ where $\lambda_k$ is constant failure rate

Assuming the failure rates of components are statistically independent. The overall system reliability  $R_{ser}(t)$ 

$$\boldsymbol{R}_{ser}(t) = \boldsymbol{R}_{1}(t) \times \boldsymbol{R}_{2}(t) \times \boldsymbol{R}_{3}(t) \times \ldots \times \boldsymbol{R}_{n}(t)$$

 $R_{ser}(t) = \prod_{i=1}^{n} R_i(t)$  where  $\Pi$  is a product operator

No redundancy: Overall system reliability depends on the proper working of each component

$$R_{ser}(t) = e^{-t\left(\sum_{i=1}^{n}\lambda_i\right)}$$
 Serial Failure rate,  $\lambda_{ser} = \sum_{i=1}^{n}\lambda_i$ 

# **System Reliability**

# Building a reliable serial system is extraordinarily difficult and expensive.

For example: if one is to build a serial system with 100 components each of which had a reliability of 0.999, the overall system reliability would be  $(0.999)^{100} = 0.905$ 

**Reliability of System of Components** 



#### **Minimal Path Set:**

Minimal set of components whose functioning ensures the functioning of the system {1,3,4} {2,3,4} {1,5} {2,5}

# **Parallel System Reliability**

### **Parallel Connected Components**

# $Q_{k}(t)$ is equal to 1 - $R_{k}(t)$ where $R_{k}(t)$ is the reliability of a single component k

 $Q_k(t) = 1 - e^{-\lambda_k t}$  where  $\lambda_k$  is a constant failure rate

Assuming the failure rates of components are statistically independent.  $Q_{par}(t) = \prod_{i=1}^{n} Q_i(t)$ 

i=1

**Overall system reliability,** 
$$R_{par}(t) = 1 - \prod_{i=1}^{n} [1 - R_i(t)]$$

**Consider 4 identical modules are connected in parallel** System will operate correctly provided at least one module is operational. If the reliability of each module is 0.95. The overall system reliability = 1-[1-0.95]<sup>4</sup> = 0.99999375

©G. Khan

# **Parallel-Serial Reliability**

**Parallel and Serial Connected Components** 



Total reliability is the reliability of the first half, in serial with the second half. Given R1=0.9, R2=0.9, R3=0.99, R4=0.99, R5=0.87

Rt = [1-(1-0.9)(1-0.9)][1-(1-0.87)(1-(0.99\*0.99))]= 0.987

## **Reliability Analysis of Serial-Parallel Systems**

### **MTTF: Mean Time To Failure or Expected Life**

MTTF is also used to specify the reliability of a system. It is given by  $E[X] = \int_{0}^{\infty} R(t)dt = 1/\lambda$ 

MTTF of Serial and Parallel Systems MTTF<sub>SER</sub>=  $1/\sum_{\substack{n \ n}}^{n} \lambda_i$ MTTF<sub>PAR</sub>=  $1/\lambda \sum_{\substack{n \ i=1}}^{n} 1/i \approx \ln(n) / \lambda$ 

### **Reliability of TMR System**

 $R_{TMR}(t) = 3R^{2}(t) - 2R^{3}(t) = 3e^{-2\lambda t} - 2e^{-3\lambda t}$ For smaller *t*,  $R_{TMR}(t)$  is large but for large *t* it is small Threshold time =  $\ln 2/\lambda = 0.7/\lambda$ 

©G. Khan

# **Embedded System Development**

<u>Stages</u>	<b>Error Sources</b>	<b>Error Detection</b>
Specification & design	Algorithm Design Formal Specification	Consistency checks Simulation
ucoign	Specification	Simulation
Prototype	Algorithm design	Stimulus/response
	Wiring & assembly	Testing
	Timing Commence Fe llower	
	Component Failure	
Manufacture	Wiring & assembly	System testing
	<b>Component failure</b>	Diagnostics
Installation	Assombly	System testing
Instanation	Component failure	Diagnostics
		Diagnostics
<b>Field Operation</b>	<b>Component failure</b>	Diagnostics
	<b>Operator errors</b>	
	<b>Environmental factors</b>	

# **Faults and Their Sources**

#### What is a Fault?

# *Fault* is an erroneous state of software or hardware resulting from failures of its components

### **Fault Sources**

Design errors Software or Hardware Manufacturing Problems Damage, Fatigue and Deterioration External disturbances Harsh environmental conditions, electromagnetic interference and ionization radiation System Misuse

## **Fault Sources**

### **Mechanical -- "wears out"**

**Deterioration: wear, fatigue, corrosion** 

Shock: fractures, overload, etc.

### **Electronic Hardware -- "bad fabrication; wears out"**

Latent manufacturing defects

**Operating environment: noise, heat, ESD, electro-migration Design defects (Pentium F-DIV bug)** 

### Software -- "bad design"

**Design defects** 

"Code rot" -- accumulated run-time faults

### People

Can take a whole lecture content...

# **Fault and Classifications**

### **Failure:** Component does not provide service **Fault:** A defect within a system

### **Error: (manifestation of a fault)**

A deviation from the required operation of the system or subsystem

**Extent:** Local (independent) or Distributed (related) **Value:** 

Determinate (stuck at high or low) Indeterminate (varying values)

### **Duration:**

- Transient- design errors, environment
- Intermittent- repair by replacement
- Permanent- repair by replacement

# **Fault-Tolerant Computing**

### Main aspects of FTC: Fault Tolerant Computing

- Fault detection
- Fault isolation and containment
- System recovery
- Fault Diagnosis
  - Repair Fault Detection Isolation Recovery td ti tr Switch-in Spare Diagnosis & Repair Time

# **Tolerating Faults**

There is four-fold categorization to deal with the system faults and increase system reliability and/or availability.

### **Methods for Minimizing Faults**

Fault Avoidance: How to prevent the fault occurrence.

*by construction* increase reliability by conservative design and use high reliability components.

**Fault Tolerance:** How to provide the service complying with the specification in spite of faults having occurred or occurring.

by redundancy

Fault Removal: How to minimize the presence of faults.

by verification

**Fault Forecasting:** How to estimate the presence, occurrence, and the consequences of faults. *by evaluation* 

# *Fault-Tolerance* is the ability of a computer system to survive in the presence of faults.

©G. Khan

# **Fault-Tolerance Techniques**

### Hardware Fault Tolerance Software Fault Tolerance

### Hardware Fault-tolerance Techniques

- Fault Detection
- Redundancy (masking, dynamic)

Use of extra components to mask the effect of a faulty component. (Static and Dynamic) Redundancy alone does not guarantee fault tolerance.

It guarantee higher fault arrival rates (extra hardware).

#### **Redundancy Management is Important**

A fault tolerant computer can end up spending as much as 50% of its throughput in managing redundancy.

## **Hardware Fault-Tolerance**

### **Fault Detection**

Detection of a failure is a challenge Many faults are latent that show up (a lot) later Use watchdog timer ?

### Fault detection gives warning when a fault occurs.

*Duplication:* Two identical copies of hardware run the same computation and compare each other results. When the results do not match a fault is declared.

# Redundancy

### **Static and Dynamic Redundancy**

Extra components mask the effect of a faulty component.

### • Masking Redundancy

Static redundancy as once the redundant copies of an element are installed, their interconnection remains fixed e.g. TMR (Triple Modular Redundancy) where three identical copies of modules provide separate results to a voter that produces a majority vote.

### • Dynamic Redundancy

System configuration is changed in response to a fault. Its success largely depends upon the fault detection ability.

©G. Khan

22



- P1, P2 and P3 processors execute different versions of the code for the same application.
- Voter compares the results and forward the majority vote of results (two out of three).

# TMR based hardware redundancy is transparent to the programmer

# **Software Fault-Tolerance**

# Hardware based fault-tolerance provides tolerance against physical i.e. hardware faults.

#### How to tolerate design/software faults?

It is virtually impossible to produce fully correct software. **We need something:** 

To prevent software bugs from causing system disasters. To mask out software bugs.

Tolerating unanticipated design faults is much more difficult than tolerating anticipated physical faults.

#### **Software Fault Tolerance is needed as:**

Software bugs will occur no matter what we do. No fully dependable way of eliminating these bugs. These bugs have to be tolerated.

### **Software Failures**









# **Some Software Failures**

### Software failure lead to partial/total system crashes

Cost of software has exceeded the cost of hardware. Penalty costs for software failure are more significant.

### **Some Spectacular Software Failures**

- Space shuttle malfunction in 1982.
- Lethal doses of therapy radiation to Canadians in 1986.
- AT&T's telephone switching network failure in 1990.
- Loss of Ariane rocket and its payload in June 1996.
- Computer problems Airbus-330 Qantas flight from Singapore to Perth, October 2008.
- Airbus 330 AF flight 447, Rio de Janeiro to Paris May 2009
- iPhone 3G Glitches 2010 Dropped calls & choppy web surfing <a href="http://www5.in.tum.de/~huckle/bugse.html">http://www5.in.tum.de/~huckle/bugse.html</a>

## **Some Software Failures**

1. **Blackout 2003** - power plant went offline due to high demand from grid, power network went under great stress, power lines heated up. Started hanging and destroying the network to 20% of its capacity

- The blackout could have been averted (proper shutdowns etc.)

- Software bug in control center alarm system caused a race condition, that caused the alarm system to freeze and stop processing these alerts to the workers.

2. **Radiation therapy** - Therac-25 administered radiation therapy to treat cancer patients. So while operator was configuring machine it would go into fail safe mode. During fail safe mode, "Arithmetic overflow" occurred during an automatic safety check, and patient was not in place. So while operator was configuring machine it would go into fail safe -- beams 100 times higher than intended would be fired into the patient.

3. **USS Yorktown CG-48**, navy ship, carries artillery, fighter jets etc. Was stuck in the water for 3 hours due to a complete failure of its propulsion system. One of the crew member typed 0 in one of the on-board systems - caused a division by zero crashed the control system.

©G. Khan

27

# **Tolerating Software Failures**

### How to Tolerate Software Faults?

# Software fault-tolerance uses *design redundancy* to mask residual design faults of software programs.

Software Fault Tolerance Strategy

### **Defensive Programming**

If you can not be sure that what you are doing is correct. Do it in many ways.

#### Some of them will turn to be right.

Review and test the software.

Verify the software.

#### **Execute the specifications**

**Produce programs automatically** 

Full tools & technology were not available in the past

# **SW Fault-Tolerance Techniques**

#### **Software Fault Detection is a bigger challenge** Many software faults are of latent type that shows up later, Can use a watchdog to figure out if the program is crashed

### Fault-tolerant Software Design Techniques

- Recovery block scheme (RB) Dynamic redundancy-- Use an on-line acceptance test to determine which version to believe.
- N-version programming scheme (NVP) n-modular redundancy -- Write use multiple versions of the software and vote the results.
- Hardware redundancy is needed to implement the above Software Fault-tolerance techniques.

©G. Khan

29

# **SW Fault-Tolerance Techniques**

### Fault-tolerant Software Design Techniques

- Recovery block scheme (RB) Dynamic redundancy
- N-version programming scheme (NVP) n-modular redundancy

 Hardware redundancy is needed to implement the above Software Fault-tolerance techniques.

# **Software Fault-Tolerance** Fault-tolerant Software Design Techniques



RB

NVP



**NSCP: N-Self Checking Programming** 

# **NVP: N-Version Programming**

#### N-independent program variants execute in parallel

#### **Each program variant must be developed using different** Algorithms, Techniques, Programming Languages, Environments, Tools, etc.

### For basic NVP, voting is done at the end

in <u>community-error-recovery</u> voting at intermediate points is done. Requires synchronization of programs at intermediate comparison points.

i.e. errors are detected and recovered at checkpoints which are inserted in all the versions of the software

#### **N Self-Checking Version (NSCP)** uses intermediate voting Similar to *community-error-recovery* but acceptance test is by comparison checking.

# **RB: Recovery Block**

**RB** Scheme comprises of three elements

A primary module to execute critical software functions. Acceptance test for the output of primary module. Alternate modules perform the same functions as of primary.

#### **A Simple Recovery Block Scheme**

 $\begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} \mbox{Calculating Square Root of x} \\ \mbox{Ensure AT} & |y^*y - x| = 0 \\ \mbox{By P} & y = sqrt(x) \end{array}$   $\begin{array}{c} \mbox{Else A_1} \\ \mbox{Else A_2} \end{array}$   $\begin{array}{c} \mbox{Else by A_{n-1}} \\ \mbox{Else Error} \end{array}$   $\begin{array}{c} \mbox{AT} = acceptance test condition \\ \mbox{P is the primary module.} \\ \mbox{A_{1=> n-1} are alternate modules.} \end{array}$ 

# **RB: Recovery Block Scheme** An Architectural View of RB



## **Fault Recovery**

Fault recovery technique's success depends on the detection of faults accurately and as early as possible.

### **Three classes of recovery procedures:** Full Recovery

It requires all the aspects of fault tolerant computing. **Degraded recovery: Also referred as** *graceful degradation* Similar to full recovery but no subsystem is switched-in. **Defective component is taken out of service.** Suited for multiprocessors.

#### Safe Shutdown

Often called fail-safe operations.

A limiting case of degraded recovery.



Fault recovery techniques restore enough of the system state that can restart a process execution without loss of acquired information.

**Two Basic Approaches:** 

#### **Forward Recovery**

**Produces correct results through continuation of normal processing.** 

**Highly application dependent** 

#### **Backward Recovery**

Some redundant process and state information is recorded with the progress of computation.

Rollback the interrupted process to a point for which the correct information is available.

# **Backward Recovery Schemes**

#### Retry

**Operation is retried after fault detection.** 

Suits to transient faults.

In case of hard failures, reconfiguration is attempted.

#### Checkpointing

Some subset of system is saved at checkpoints and rollback is attempted.

JPL STAR and Tandem computer systems

#### Journaling

- Copy of the initial database is saved.
- All transactions that effect the data are kept on record during the process execution.
- When the process fails, recorded transactions are run on the backup data.

37

# **Concluding Remarks**

- The common techniques for fault handling are fault avoidance, fault detection, masking redundancy, and dynamic redundancy.
- Any reliable embedded system must have its failure response carefully built into it, as some complementary set of actions and responses.
- System reliability can be modeled at a component and module level, assuming the failure rate is constant (exponential distribution).
- Reliability must be built into the embedded system project from the start.